Bank risk disclosures, such as Value-at-Risk (VaR), are a¤ected by both changes in market volatility and bank's risk exposures. While the latter is typically unknown to the public, we show how to estimate it from public data on VaR and volatility. We propose a methodology, which we call Factor Implied Risk Exposure (FIRE), that breakdowns a change in risk disclosure into an exogenous volatility component and an endogenous risk exposure component. In a study of large US and international banks, we show that (1) the main driving force of bank risk disclosures is the shifts in risk exposures, (2) changes in risk exposures are negatively correlated with volatility changes, which suggests that banks reduce risk taking when volatility increases, and that (3) changes in risk exposures are positively correlated among banks, which is consistent with banks exhibiting herding behavior in trading.
Introduction
Public risk disclosures at banks serve two main purposes. First, they reduce information asymmetry between the bank and its investors/depositors, and hence lower the bank's cost of capital. Second, they are used by banking regulators to set banks'regulatory capital. During economic downturns, as market volatility spikes, risk disclosures and capital requirements tend to mechanically increase. In response, many banks are forced to liquidate part of their trading positions, which further ampli…es market volatility (Brunnermeier and In this paper, we extract information about the actual risk exposures of banks from their risk disclosures, with special emphasis on Value-at-Risk (VaR). 1 The level of risk disclosures depends on two main factors. First, it re ‡ects current market conditions and as such, tends to rise with market volatility. A second driving force of a bank's risk disclosures, but one that is often hidden to the public eye, is the actual risk exposures of the bank. Indeed, taking over a major stock broker would lead to a higher equity VaR for the acquiring bank. Similarly, implementing an aggressive trading strategy on the commodity market would certainly boost the commodity risk …gures.
We show how to decompose a change in risk disclosure into an exogenous volatility component and an endogenous risk exposure component. The trick we use is straightforward, yet powerful. For a broad family of distributions, the VaR is de…ned as the product of the standard deviation of the return and the dollar amount invested (up to a constant scaling factor).
Consequently, the change in VaR can either be due to a change in volatility or in the amount invested, or both. As the former two pieces of information are public information, they can be used to extract an implied measure of the latter. This framework, which we call Factor Implied Risk Exposure (FIRE), allows us to answer three related research questions. What is the main driving force for banks'risk disclosure: volatility or risk exposures? Do volatility and risk exposure components move in the same direction? If they do, they exacerbate the 1 The VaR corresponds to a loss that should only be exceeded with a given target probability over a given time horizon. The perimeter of the VaR model is the trading portfolio of the …nancial institution. procyclicality of risk disclosures and, in turn, of banks'regulatory capital. Our third question is: Are changes in risk exposures correlated across banks? In other words, we investigate whether banks exhibit herding behavior in trading and whether herding strengthens when …nancial markets are under stress.
To develop the intuition underlying our approach, we display in Table 1 con…dence level and with a one-day horizon. One attractive feature of this dataset is that it includes risk …gures (factor VaR) that are de…ned separately for each source of risk: equity risk, interest rate risk, foreign exchange (FX) risk, and commodity price risk. During this period, volatility fell across all asset classes. The actual reduction in volatility was 46% in the equity market, 43% in the …xed-income market, 39% in the FX market, and 59% in the commodity market. 2 Despite the overall drop in volatility, we identify 17 cases, out of 40, in which the VaR increased over the same period. One potential explanation of this puzzling result is that volatility (#) and risk exposures (") moved in opposite directions and that the risk exposure e¤ect dominated the volatility e¤ect for some banks.
< Insert Table 1 >
In the empirical part of the paper, we use quarterly VaR data publicly disclosed by the same ten banks between 2007 and 2012. We use separate VaR …gures for each major source of risk: equity, interest rate, FX, and commodity. To control for concurrent changes in volatility, we use several proxies including implied volatility and historical volatility. Our empirical analysis leads to several new …ndings on the risk taking of banks. First, we …nd that VaR covaries more frequently and more strongly with risk exposures than with market volatility. Second, we show that changes in risk exposures are negatively correlated with volatility changes, which suggests that banks reduce risk taking when volatility increases.
Third, changes in risk exposures are positively correlated among banks, which is consistent with banks engaging in herding behavior. When we compare periods of increasing volatility and periods of decreasing volatility, we …nd that the negative relationship between volatility and risk exposures and commonality in risk exposures are present in all market conditions. Our paper makes several contributions to the literature on …nancial risk management.
First, on the methodological side, we show how to extract an implied measure of changes in bank risk exposures from publicly available data on VaR and volatility. By doing so, we complement Taylor (2005) who shows how to generate volatility forecasts from market risk disclosures. Second, we empirically document the presence of commonality in the risk exposures of large banks. Our decomposition of the changes in risk disclosure allows us to directly test for similarities in trading positions by looking at bank risk exposures and not at trading pro…t-and-loss data (Berkowitz, Christo¤ersen and Pelletier, 2011) . In two distinct studies of large US banks, Berkowitz and O'Brien (2002) and Jorion (2006) both report a moderate correlation between US banks' trading pro…t-and-loss, which does not support the herding hypothesis. Di¤erently, our empirical evidence on the dynamics of bank risk exposures during the recent crisis is consistent with herding in trading. Third, we contribute to the debate on the procyclicality of regulatory capital. We report a negative correlation between market volatility and risk exposures, which suggests that banks reduce risk taking when volatility surges. This contrarian risk taking behavior can be seen as an attempt to damper the procyclicality of bank regulatory capital. However, as banks tend to rebalance their risk exposures at the same time and in the same direction, this intended reduction in regulatory capital is partly o¤set by some volatility feedback e¤ects.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present a methodology allowing us to extract information about changes in banks'risk exposures from public data. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis using actual VaR data for a sample of large US and international banks. We show in Section 4 how to extend the methodology to other types of risk disclosures. Section 5 summarizes and concludes our study.
Dynamics of Risk Disclosure

FIRE Methodology
When the distribution of the (demeaned) returns belongs to the location-scale family, the conditional VaR of an asset can be expressed as:
where t is the conditional volatility of the asset return, F 1 ( ) is the -quantile of the standardized return distribution, and W is the dollar amount invested in the asset (Jorion, 2007) . We see that there are two factors driving the VaR in this set-up, namely the volatility and the amount invested. 3 The change in amount invested can be due to the return of the asset or to in ‡ow/out ‡ow from the investor. The change in VaR is given by:
Note that the coverage rate is assumed to be constant between two dates. The percentage change in VaR is:
As a result, the percentage change in the dollar amount invested in the asset is:
This equation is extremely useful. It allows us to infer the change in amount invested (unknown) from the change in VaR and volatility (both being observed). 
For instance, for equity, this means that the return on the bank's equity portfolio can be imperfectly correlated with the US equity market, as proxied by the S&P 500 stock index. The idea behind the one-factor structure is that we focus on a subportfolio that is predominantly a¤ected by one major source of risk (e.g., equity portfolio, commodity portfolio). From Equation (9), we can express the variance of R if t , 2 if t , as:
where 2 f t is the variance of the factor return and 2 "t is the variance of the idiosyncratic return. In that case, Equation (1) becomes:
where E if t is the risk exposure of …rm i with respect to factor f at time t de…ned by:
We notice that when "t << f t , the risk exposure converges towards W if t if t . What this expression tells us is that there are two main ways for a bank to modify its risk exposure:
…rst, the bank can change the size of its portfolio and second, it can modify the sensitivity of its portfolio with respect to a risk factor.
The change in VaR is given by:
The percentage change in VaR is:
The percentage change in risk exposure between dates t and t + 1, which we denote % E if t , is given by:
Equation (20) gives an expression for the changes in risk exposure as a function of the changes in VaR and in the volatility of the risk factor.
It is important to notice that the FIRE methodology works with both long and short positions. For a short position, the VaR is de…ned by:
with W if t < 0 (Giot and Laurent, 2003) . In that case, the percentage change is also given by Equation (18) and the percentage change in risk exposure by Equation (20) . 4 In practice, both the VaR and the volatility have to be estimated. The VaR …gures disclosed by the banks are issued from their internal risk model which is generally unknown to the public (Pérignon and Smith, 2010b) . The volatility of the risk factor can be estimated by a GARCH model, a realized/historical measure, or by an implied volatility measure (e.g., 4 If we further assume that the marginal distribution F is symmetric, then the VaR becomes V aR if t = if t F 1 f ( ) jW if t j for both long and short positions. Under the symmetry assumption, the FIRE methodology is robust to a change in position from a long position to a short position, and vice versa. In that symmetric case, the percentage change in risk exposure is still given by Equation (20) . As a result, changing the size of the position from 1000 to 200, or from 1000 to -200, lead to the same the changes in risk exposure. We obtain a similar result if we consider the following changes in position size: (from 200 to 1000 and from 200 to -1000), (from -1000 to -200 and from -1000 to 200), and (from -200 to -1000 and from -200 to 1000). VIX). In practice, both the VaR and the volatility estimates can be a¤ected by estimation risk or model risk (Escanciano and Olmo, 2010; Gourieroux and Zakoian, 2013) . However, as long as the ratio of the estimated VaR (respectively volatility) and the true VaR (respectively volatility) remains constant between t and t+1, these potential estimation errors do not a¤ect the risk exposures produced by the FIRE methodology. Indeed, these exposures only depend on the relative variations of VaR and volatility.
Case Study on Goldman Sachs
In order the check whether the changes in risk exposures produced by the FIRE methodology make economic sense, it would be ideal to compare the estimated risk exposure changes to the actual risk exposure changes. As the latter are typically unknown to the public, such comparison is hard to make in practice. However, we found one …rm for which the comparison is possible. Indeed, Goldman Sachs makes some statements in its quarterly public …lings about the recent changes in its trading portfolio. To our knowledge, Goldman Sachs is the only …nancial institution to make such public announcements in a systematic way over an extended period of time.
To be able to extract the implied risk exposures, we collect quarterly equity VaR …gures from all Goldman Sachs 10-Q forms between 2003Q1 and 2012Q3. 5 Furthermore, we control for contemporaneous changes in volatility in the stock market using the VIX index. Figure 1 displays the quarterly values of the equity VaR along with the VIX index (both are average measures over the quarter). Eyeballing the …gure shows little covariation between the VaR and the market volatility. In fact, if anything, the correlation is negative. 6 and volatility is of course true if the risk exposure remains constant through time. However, in 5 The VaR …gures are one-day 99% VaR averaged over a given quarter. See Section 3 for a sample including more banks and more sources of risk. 6 We got a similar pattern when we replace the VIX by the standard-deviation of daily returns on the S&P500 stock index using a three-month estimation window. We conduct a similar analysis for all 27 quarterly reports between 2004Q1 and 2012Q3.
For each quarter, we compare the change in equity risk exposure provided by the FIRE methodology with the information disclosed by the …rm in its 10-Q report. As shown in Table   2 , we have not been able to …nd any case in which the FIRE estimate and the 10-Q form contradict each other. Note that this result is not due to any major trend in risk exposures as increases in risk exposures are as frequent as reductions in risk disclosure in our sample (nine increases and nine decreases). Furthermore, there are another nine quarters for which Goldman Sachs made no particular comments. Interestingly, we notice that these quarters correspond to periods during which the equity risk exposure was more stable. We …nd that during high VaR change quarters (j V aR=V aRj > 30%), the …rm makes comments in 92.9% of the cases (13 out of 14 quarters), whereas during low VaR change quarters (j V aR=V aRj 30%), the …rm makes comments in only 38.5% of the cases (5 out of 13 quarters).
< Insert Table 2 >
We consider a series of robustness checks. First, we replace average VaR and VIX values by their end-of-quarter values. We, again, systematically compare the estimated change in risk exposure given by the FIRE methodology to actual statements made by the …rm for the 27 di¤erent quarters. Second, we conduct a similar analysis using annual 10-K forms between 2004 and 2012, which leads to another 18 comparisons. In annual reports, the company compares its average (respectively year-end) equity-risk exposure in year Y to its average (respectively year-end) equity-risk exposure in year Y-1. For these 45 comparisons, there are speci…c comments from the …rm in 24 cases. In two cases only the sign of the change in implied risk exposure does not match the company's report. However, in both cases, the implied changes in risk exposure is small (-2% and 7%), which makes misclassi…cation more likely.
Overall, the results in this case study are reassuring. Despite the assumptions we made about the distribution and the factor structure of the return, the FIRE methodology seems to produce some risk estimates that …t well with reality. In the following section, we expand the analysis to more banks and factors and investigate the comovements in risk exposures across banks.
Changes in Risk Exposures at Large Banks
First Input: VaR
In this section, we study the actual changes in risk exposures at large banks before, during, and after the 2008 crisis. These risk exposure changes are extracted from the VaR of ten large US and international banks between 2007Q3 and 2012Q3 (see Table 1 for a list of the sample banks). VaR …gures are publically disclosed in the quarterly and annual reports of the …rms.
These reports have been retrieved from the EDGAR database for US banks and from the …rms'websites for international banks. The VaR …gures typically have a one-day horizon and a 99% con…dence level and are available on four di¤erent risk factors: equity, interest rate, FX, and commodity. 7 We …rst show in Figure 3 and Table 3 that the factor VaRs exhibit some weak positive covariation across banks. Table 3 and report the average correlation between the change in the VaR of a bank, V aR if t , and the change in the VaR of all other sample banks for each risk factor, V aR jf t , j 6 = i (upper panel). We report a positive average correlation for all four risk factors, which re ‡ects the fact that VaR numbers are a¤ected by some common volatility shocks. However, the magnitude of these correlations is not very high: in the 30%-40% range for equity and interest rate and less than 10% for FX and commodity. Furthermore, we measure in the lower panel of Table 3 the frequency with which the VaRs of banks i and j move in the same direction.
The percentage of matching signs between V aR if t and V aR jf t is rather low, around 50%, with a maximum rate of 58% for the interest-rate risk.
< Insert Figure 3 and Table 3 >
Second Input: Volatility
In order to control for concurrent changes in volatility, we use some factor volatility indices.
These indices are extracted from options written on the di¤erent underlying factors and with maturities between one and three months. Speci…cally, we use the CBOE VIX index to proxy the volatility of the equity market. The volatility on the …xed income market is measured by the Merrill Lynch Move index, which tracks the implied volatility of Treasury bond prices.
The volatility on the FX market is measured by the CVIX, a measure of implied volatility of major currency exchange rates. Finally, the volatility on the commodity market is measured by the OVX, a measure of implied volatility in West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices. 8 We display the evolution of the volatility of each risk factor in Table 4 that the VaR and the factor volatility tend to be positively correlated for all risk factors. The average correlation is lowest for commodity risk (2%) and highest for interest rate (48%). We also notice that this correlation is not positive for all banks. In fact, there are only two banks in our sample for which the correlation is positive for all fours factors, and the factor VaR of Morgan Stanley is negatively correlated with volatility for all factors. Also, when we compute the percentage of matching signs between the changes in VaR and in volatility, we …nd a frequency in the 40-50% range. This …nding suggests that in many occasions, the evolution of the bank risk disclosures and market volatility diverge. Another implications of our preliminary set of results is that market volatility does not seem to be a dominant driving force for factor VaR.
< Insert Table 4 >
Implied Risk Exposure
To formally gauge the impact of volatility and risk exposure changes on VaR, we implement the FIRE methodology that was presented in Section 2. For each bank/quarter, we plug the percentage change in VaR and the percentage change in volatility into Equation (20) to get the implied risk exposure variation for each risk factor. To get a …rst look at the results, we superimpose the evolution of the VaR, volatility, and implied risk exposure for equity in Figure 5 . The message we obtain is unambiguous: the change in risk exposures is the main driving force for equity VaR.
Another important …nding is that changes in risk exposure and volatility tend to move in opposite directions. We analyze the relationship between risk exposure and volatility for all factors and all banks in Table 5 . In the upper panel of the table, we …nd that the percentage changes in risk exposure and volatility are negative for virtually all …rms and all factors. On average, this correlation is -56% for equity, -52% for interest rate, -26% for FX, and -57% for commodity. Moreover, as shown in the lower panel of Table 5 , rarely do the changes in risk exposure and volatility move in the same direction.
< Insert Figure 5 and Table 5 > Are risk exposures correlated across banks? To answer this question, we report in the upper panel of Table 6 the average correlation between the changes in risk exposure of a bank, % E if t , and the change in risk exposure of all other sample banks, % E jf t , j 6 = i.
The lower panel of this table displays the frequency with which changes in risk exposure of banks i and j move in the same direction. The main takeaway from this table is that there is some strong commonality in bank risk exposures, which is consistent with herding in trading.
Indeed, 39 out of the 40 average correlation coe¢ cients among the changes in risk exposures are positive. Moreover, risk adjustments at two random sample banks will go in the same direction between 59% and 65% of the time, which is signi…cantly higher than the …gures for the VaR in Table 3 . Table 6 > Furthermore, we control for other variables that could also a¤ect banks' risk exposures and estimate the following OLS multivariate regression:
where E jf t is P i6 =j E jf t =(N 1), N is the number of sample banks, and R f t denotes the quarterly return of the risk factor. In our tests, we use the following indices for the four risk factors: S&P500 Index (equity), 3 Table 7 that the estimated coe¢ cients associated with other banks'risk exposures ( 1 ) is positive and signi…cant for most factors. This result is suggestive of commonality in risk exposures due to similar investment or hedging policies across banks. In contrast with other sources of risk, we …nd no commonality in FX risk exposures.
The estimated coe¢ cients associated with the change in volatility ( 2 ) are all negative and statistically signi…cant, which is consistent with the univariate results in Table 5 .
< Insert Table 7 >
Several reasons can explain the commonality in risk exposures documented in Tables 6 and   7 . First, banks can rebalance their trading portfolio in a correlated way because of common information or regulatory constraints. Second, the exposure of two banks with respect to a given factor can also increase because the return of this factor was positive over the past quarter. We intend to disentangle the two channels using the following panel regression:
where E jf t R f t is P i6 =j ( E jf t R f t )=(N 1). In this speci…cation, we systematically remove the return on the factor from the change in risk exposure. Results in the lower panel of Table 7 clearly indicate that commonality in risk exposure is not mainly due to factor returns. Indeed, the coe¢ cient associated with other banks' changes in risk exposures ( 1 ) remains positive and signi…cant for all factors, except FX. We also notice that the strong negative relationship between volatility and risk exposure is preserved ( 2 ).
Robustness Checks
In order to test whether our conclusions remain valid in di¤erent market conditions, we split the sample into two subperiods. The …rst one covers 2007Q3-2008Q4 and corresponds to a period of sharp increase in market volatility (see Figure 4) . The second subperiod, 2009Q1-2010Q1, corresponds to a period of massive reduction in market volatility. We show in Table   8 that the quarterly average change in factor volatility ranges between 22% and 27% in the …rst period and between -11% and -19% in the second period. Overall, we …nd that our conclusions about the dynamics of the risk exposures are persistent through the di¤erent phases of the volatility cycle. In particular, we …nd that the negative correlation between changes in volatility and risk exposure is a robust feature of the data. Furthermore, we report evidence of commonality in risk exposures across banks in both volatility regimes.
Another robustness check is to change the volatility proxy and rerun the main tests of our analysis. Instead of using volatility indices, we compute a measure of historical volatility during a given quarter. Speci…cally, we compute the historical standard deviation of the same factor indices as in Table 7 and display this new set of results in Table 9 . Overall, our message is preserved. Indeed, we …nd that VaR covaries much more with risk exposure than with volatility and that banks adjust their trading portfolio in a correlated way. Taken as a whole, the results tend to be stronger with historical volatility than with the volatility indices we use in the rest of the study. where m and m s are two positive multiplicative factors set by the regulators and subject to an absolute minimum of 3, and the avg subscript stands for an average computed over sixty business days.
We show in this section that it is possible to use the FIRE methodology with stressed, instead of standard, VaR …gures. In fact, it turns out that is much easier to learn about changes in risk exposures from stressed VaRs than it is from standard VaRs. The reason being that changes in stressed VaR are only due to changes in risk exposures, and not to changes in volatility (recall that, with stressed VaR, the volatility is always measured during the same high-volatility period). We make this point formally by de…ning the stressed VaR as:
where denotes the conditional variance of the return measured over a particularly volatile period. We note that the variance parameter is not changing from one day to the next as it refers to a given high-volatility episode in the past. As a result, the change in stressed VaR is given by:
Then, we conclude that:
This equation shows that changes in stressed VaR only re ‡ect changes in risk exposures.
Unlike with standard VaR, changes in stressed VaR are completely immunized from volatility shocks, which greatly simpli…es the analysis.
Conclusion
Market volatility is clearly an important factor when it comes to compute the VaR of a bank.
But we show in this paper that it is unlikely to be the most important factor. Using a sample of large US and international banks, we …nd that the main driving force of bank risk disclosures is the shifts in risk exposures and not market volatility. Furthermore, we show that changes in risk disclosures are negatively correlated with volatility changes, which suggests that banks reduce risk taking when volatility increases. Finally, we provide empirical evidence of commonality in risk exposures across banks, which supports the view that banks exhibit herding behavior in trading.
The results presented in this paper have some important implications for the dynamics of banks'regulatory capital. Indeed, our paper documents two sources of procyclicality in bank capital. The …rst one is due to the original increase in volatility while the second one arises from further volatility increases triggered by correlated risk exposures across banks. Notes: The source for the VaR …gures are the EDGAR database for US banks and …rms'websites for internatinal banks. We use a speci…c implied volatility index for each risk factor. The volatility on the equity market is measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange VIX index. The volatility on the …xed income market is measured by the Merrill Lynch MOVE index, which tracks the volatility of Treasury bond prices using implied volatility from 30-day options. The volatility on the foreign exchange market is measured by the Deutsche Bank CVIX index, an average 3-month implied volatility for all the major currency pairs. 
Commodity
OVX
Notes: This …gure displays the daily factor volatility for each risk factor (equity, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity) from 2007Q2 to 2012Q3. The volatility on the equity market is measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange VIX index. The volatility on the …xed income market is measured by the Merrill Lynch MOVE index, which tracks the volatility of Treasury bond prices using implied volatility from 30-day options. The volatility on the foreign exchange market is measured by the Deutsche Bank CVIX index, an average 3-month implied volatility for all the major currency pairs. The volatility on the commodity market is measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange OVX index, a measure of 30-day implied volatility in West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices. 
